Principles Governing Quashing of Criminal Proceedings

1. The power to quash criminal proceedings is an extraordinary jurisdiction exercised to prevent abuse of the process of law, avert miscarriage of justice, and secure the ends of justice. Such power may be exercised by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution or under its inherent powers preserved by Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (now Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023), and in appropriate cases, by the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution.

2. Section 482 Cr.P.C. does not confer any new power but merely recognises and preserves the inherent powers of the High Court, enabling it to pass such orders as may be necessary to (i) give effect to any order under the Code, (ii) prevent abuse of the process of any court, or (iii) otherwise secure the ends of justice. These powers may even be exercised suo motu, subject to judicial restraint. In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, this Court authoritatively held that the High Court must exercise such powers to prevent abuse of process or to secure justice.

3. In State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi, (2005) 1 SCC 568, reiterating Bhajan Lal (supra), this Court clarified that the width of powers under Article 226 and Section 482 Cr.P.C. is wide and unfettered, permitting consideration of material of unimpeachable character in appropriate cases to prevent abuse of process.

4. In Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Special Judicial Magistrate, (1998) 5 SCC 749, it was held that the nomenclature of a petition is immaterial, and the High Court may exercise jurisdiction under Article 226, Article 227, or Section 482 Cr.P.C., as the case may be, to correct grave errors and prevent injustice.

5. The scope and rationale of inherent powers were lucidly explained in Talab Haji Hussain v. Madhukar Purshottam Mondkar, 1958 SCC OnLine SC 81, wherein this Court held that inherent powers exist to address procedural lacunae and cannot be invoked where the matter is covered by specific provisions of the Code or where such exercise would be inconsistent with statutory provisions. These powers are to be exercised strictly to prevent abuse of process or to secure the ends of justice.

6. The above decisions make it clear that where the High Court is satisfied that criminal proceedings are being misused or are likely to result in injustice, it is not only empowered but duty-bound to exercise its inherent jurisdiction. The power to quash proceedings is thus a protective jurisdiction, meant to safeguard individuals from vexatious or malicious prosecutions.

GROUNDS

7. While recognising that no exhaustive formula can be laid down, this Court in Bhajan Lal (supra) illustratively identified categories of cases where quashing is justified, including cases where:

• The allegations do not disclose any offence.
• The FIR does not disclose a cognizable offence.
• The allegations are absurd or inherently improbable;
• proceedings are barred by law.
• proceedings are manifestly mala fide or maliciously instituted.

8. In Rajiv Thapar v. Madan Lal Kapoor, (2013) 3 SCC 330, this Court held that the High Court may consider material of sterling and impeccable quality produced by the accused and laid down a structured test to determine whether continuation of proceedings would amount to abuse of process. If such material completely negates the allegations and cannot be justifiably refuted, the proceedings deserve to be quashed.

9. Certain High Courts have interpreted Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 19 SCC 401, as restricting the power of quashing at the investigation stage. Such an interpretation is erroneous. Neeharika does not dilute or override Bhajan Lal, but merely reiterates the need for judicial restraint, particularly while granting interim protection during investigation.

10. Neeharika (supra) was rendered in the context of interim orders staying investigation or granting “no coercive steps” protection and holds that the same parameters applicable to quashing must guide the grant of interim relief. It does not impose an absolute bar on quashing at the investigation stage.

11. A conjoint reading of Bhajan Lal and Neeharika reveals that both decisions operate in harmony. While courts should ordinarily refrain from interfering at the investigation stage, they may do so where no offence is made out on the face of the record or where continuation of proceedings would result in miscarriage of justice.

12. Neeharika (supra) thus operates in a cautionary domain, without curtailing the inherent powers of the High Court, which remain discretionary and must be exercised judiciously based on the facts of each case.

13. In State of A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy, (2004) 6 SCC 522, this Court clarified that while appreciation of evidence is impermissible at the quashing stage, the High Court may examine such material that manifestly contradicts the allegations and demonstrates abuse of process.

14. In cases alleging malicious or vexatious prosecution, this Court in Mohammad Wajid v. State of U.P., 2023 SCC OnLine SC 951, held that courts must look beyond the mere averments in the FIR and examine attending circumstances, including background facts, multiple FIRs, and indicators of personal vendetta, and if necessary, “read between the lines”.

15. Recently, in Imran Pratapgadhi v. State of Gujarat, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 678, this Court reaffirmed that there is no absolute rule barring quashing merely because the investigation is at a nascent stage. Where the FIR discloses no prima facie offence and is mechanically registered, the High Court must intervene to prevent abuse of process, notwithstanding the stage of investigation.

Conclusion 

16. The settled legal position thus remains that the power to quash criminal proceedings, though to be exercised sparingly, is a vital constitutional and statutory safeguard to ensure that criminal law is not used as a weapon of harassment and that justice is not sacrificed at the altar of procedural formalism.